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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
post-1938 policy of federal-state conformity in matters of substantive
law. However, differentiating between substantive and procedural
rules and the effect that rules, traditionally regarded as procedural,
may have on a litigant's substantive rights, raises a question as to
whether the federal rules may encroach on the area set aside to state
law. Professor Louisell argues that "... privileged relations are
institutions of the states resulting in substantive rights under state
law which cannot be undermined by federal mandate merely because
the holder of the privilege may be involved in federal litiga-
tion. .. ".I I I
Nevertheless, absent challenge, most courts have regarded eviden-
tiary questions as procedural. For one reason or another, in non-
diversity cases, evidence which would otherwise be privileged under
state law, has generally been admitted under Federal Rule 43 (a) with-
out appreciation of the problems thereby engendered.
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO PATENT ATTORNEYS
Frequently in litigation in the federal courts, discovery of papers,
documents and the like in the possession of the opposing client or
his attorney is requested. Just as frequently, discovery of much of
the requested materials is resisted on the grounds that it is privileged.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while permitting liberal
discovery of evidence, recognize privileged material as an exception. 1
What is or is not privileged within the meaning of that term as used
in Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to be deter-
mined by the law of evidence. 2 One of the notable privileges recog-
nized in the law of evidence concerns communications between an
attorney and his client.
Historically, the attorney-client privilege developed in the courts
of England. 3 The privilege originally belonged to the attorney;
111. Supra note 104, at 120.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 allows discovery of ". . . any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence .. "
2. Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). At 499 the court stated:
"The word 'privileged' as used in Rule 26(b) relating to depositions and in Rule
34 dealing with discovery and production of documents, etc., should be interpreted
as it is in the law of evidence."
3. 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (hereinafter cited
as Wigmore).
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however, later courts interpreted the privilege as belonging to the
client. 4
The privilege, being a part of the common law, was recognized in
an early United States Supreme Court case, 5 wherein Justice Story
stated:
Whatever facts, therefore, are communicated by a client to
counsel, solely on account of that relation, such counsel are
not at liberty, even if they wish, to disclose; and the law
holds their testimony incompetent. 6
In a later United States Supreme Court decision 7 which acknowledged
the statement by Justice Story, the court added that neither the pay-
ment of a fee nor pendency of litigation was necessary to entitle a
client to the privilege.8
The modern requirements for the attorney-client privilege have
been set out by Professor Wigmore as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance per-
manently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.9
Although the attorney-client privilege is deeply embedded in the
law of this country, and is recognized by statute in numerous states,' 0
certain legal scholars have criticized the attorney-client privilege as
an anachronism. 1 1 However, the momentum of its past or the sound
logic behind the privilege, or a combination of these factors, has
sustained its presence in the law. The voice of the critics, however,
appears to have reached the ears of the courts as they evince a
reluctance to allow any expansions of the attorney-client privilege to
kindred professionals having frequent occasion to have confidential
discussions with clients. 1 2
4. Ibid.
5. Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280 (1826).
6. Id. at 294.
7. Alexander v. U.S., 138 U.S. 353 (1891).
8. Id. at 358.
9. 8 WIGMORE § 2292.
10. See listing of statutes in 8 WGMORE § 2292.
11. See e.g., Radin, Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Law-
yer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1928) and MORGAN, MODEL CODE OF EVI-
DENCE 28 (1942).
12. See 8 WIGMORE § 2286 and Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and
Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communcations Doctrine,
71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
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It is perhaps for this reason, and because of the confusion of the
courts concerning legal qualifications and functions of patent at-
torneys, that clients of patent attorneys have been frequently denied
the privilege. 1 3 In the often cited case of United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp.,14 Judge Wyzanski based his rejection of the
privilege in patent litigation upon (1) the fact that many people in
patent practice are not members of the bar of any court, (2) that
many patent department attorneys are not members of the bar of the
jurisdiction in which they practice, and (3) patent attorneys function
less as legal advisors and more as advisors of a branch of an enter-
prise founded on patents. 15
The court cited Brungger v. Smith' 6 as authority for denying
privilege to members of the patent department who were not members
of the bar of any court. As to thirteen other members of the patent
department who were members of the bar, but not of the jurisdiction
in which they were employed, the court held that because they were
not members of the bar of the local jurisdiction that they could not be
acting as attorneys.
As to the remaining members of the patent department who were
members of the bar of the local jurisdiction, the court, using guilt
by association reasoning, concluded that inasmuch as these patent
department attorneys did the same work as the non-attorneys that
they likewise were not attorneys within the privilege.1 7 In drawing
such a conclusion the court, although it did not do so expressly, actu-
ally extended the princple of Brungger v. Smith, a case involving a
solicitor who was not an attorney-at-law, to a situation unquestion-
ably involving attorneys-at-law, i.e., the patent department attorneys
who were members of the bar of the local jurisdiction.
The unfortunate extension of the principle of Brungger v. Smith
to the situation in the United Shoe case' 8 has set forth a standard
which has caused consternation to clients of patent attorneys.
Although subsequent decisions have, to some extent, mitigated the
harshness of Judge Wyzanski's test as applied to patent attorneys,
13. See e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach.'Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85
U.S.P.Q. 5 (D.Mass. 1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.
Supp. 792, 101 U.S.P.Q. 316 (D.Del. 1954); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co. 211 F. Supp. 85, 135 U.S.P.Q. 235 (D.Del. 1962).
14. 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5 (D.Mass. 1950).
15. Id. at 360.
16. 49 Fed. 124 (C.C. Mass. 1892).
17. 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5 (D.Mass. 1950).
18. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q.
5 (D. Mass. 1950).
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the specter of United Shoe continues to hover over each patent litiga-
tion. 19
It is the purpose, therefore, of this article to examine the client-
patent attorney relationship and to present a rationale suggesting
the application of the same standard in applying the privileged com-
munications doctrine in matters of patent law as exists in other
areas of the law. 2 0
The reason for allowing clients of patent attorneys to claim the
privilege would seem to be just as cogent as that which permits clients
of general law practitioners to assert the privilege. The presently
accepted policy for retaining the attorney-client privilege in the
law lies in the fact that clients are believed to more readily reveal
all the details known to them when they know that such disclosure
is exempt from discovery should litigation result.2 1 This reason
would seem to exist as much in the case of a patent attorney-client
relationship as in any other client-attorney relationship inasmuch as
each is seeking advice on a matter of law.
A client of a patent attorney is unually an inventor, a patentee or a
putative infringer, each seeking advice as to his rights. For example,
an inventor in bringing facts known only to himself would be seeking
advice from the attorney as to the patentability of his invention and
advice as to the best means of protecting his invention. The attorney
in giving advice would be relying upon statutes of the United
States2 2 and upon case law which has developed in the patent area.
Furthermore, the attorney with his knowledge of the rules of evi-
dence and of the law of trade secrets, 2 3 might advise his client that
19. Approximately ten cases of patent litigation subsequent to United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5 (D.Mass. 1950),
have cited that case. Shepard's Fed. Rep. Citations.
20. Discussion of the mechanics to be adopted by a patent attorney in pre-
serving a privileged communication has been excluded from the scope of this
comment. Such procedures would be similar to those practiced by any attorney
and have been adequately discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Haight, Keeping the
Privilege Inside the Corporation, 18 Bus. LAW. 551 (1963); Carson, Privilege and
the Work Product Rule in Corporate Law Departments, 14 Bus. LAW. 771
(1959); Hunt, Corporate Law Department Communications-Privilege and Dis-
covery, 13 VAND. L. REv. 287 (1959); Reedy, Practical Guides for the Preserva-
tion of Attorney-Client Privilege Within a Corporation, Proc. 1st. Annual Inst. on
Corp. Counsel FORDHAM U., 74 (1959).
21. 8 WIGMORE § 2291.
22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1959) set forth the standards for determining the
patentability of inventions.
23. A trade secret has been defined as a process, compound, device, etc.,
known only to the owner of it and to such employees of his to whom it must be
made known in order to be able to use it. CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed.
1940).
19641
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
even though his invention would probably be patentable, that because
of the nature of the invention and the difficulty of proving infringe-
ment thereof, the invention would be better practiced as a trade secret.
All of this is possible legal advice which an inventor impliedly expects,
and may expressly request, when he consults a patent attorney about
his invention.
That full disclosure by an inventor may serve the ends of justice
may be illustrated by the following hypothetical situation: An inven-
tor has used his invention one year prior to his consultation with
patent attorney X concerning patentability of the invention. The in-
ventor, fearing that the use is a bar to patentability, 24 conceals the
facts of the use from attorney X. Without the information concerning
the use, patent attorney X applies for letters patent and obtains
patent coverage for the inventor. This patent could result in needless
litigation, for full disclosure of the facts to attorney X would have
resulted in a determination of unpatentability if the use was actually
a bar. However, if the inventor knew that his disclosure concerning
the use were free from discovery from attorney X, then he would read-
ily disclose. Whether or not a use is a public use and therefore a bar to
patentability is a question of law. 25 Should attorney X advise the
inventor that the use was a bar, then the inventor would still feel
free to consult attorney B on the same question, knowing that attorney
X could not disclose. These consultations could certainly be good
faith consultations for different attorneys might differ in their
interpretation of certain facts and whether or not they constitute a
public use which would be a bar to patenting of an invention. That
attorneys do disagree on the legal significance of facts is amply at-
tested to by our adversary system. From this hypothetical situation
it should be evident that the privilege rule serves the same admirable
purpose when applied to patent attorneys as when applied to general
practitioners.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1954) provides: "A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States."
(Emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Armour Research Foundation v. C. K. Williams & Co., 280 F.
2d 499, 126 U.S.P.Q. 218 (7th Cir. 1960). The issue in that case being: Was the
use of ten pounds of a ferromagnetic iron oxide material some fifteen months
prior to an application for letters patent a public use within the meaning of 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) ? At 505 the court stated, "The question is not without difficulty.
While a public use more than a year prior to the application date would defeat
a patent, an experimental use would not. Whether the use by 3M was experimental,
poses a very close question." For additional cases on this subject, see, e.g., Piet v.
United States, 176 F. Supp. 576, 123 U.S.P.Q. 21 (S.D.Calif. 1959); Hantan v.
Kearney & Trecker Corp., 191 F. Supp. 420, 129 U.S.P.Q. 161 (E.D.Mich. 1961).
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A possible infringer, on the other hand, is seeking advice as to
whether or not certain acts committed or contemplated by him
constitute infringement of existing patents. While some courts have
intimated that infringement studies are not privileged as the studies
are performed upon public documents, 2 6 it is suggested that the
studies are made in reference to certain facts disclosed by the client,
therefore, the reason for the privilege exists here to the same extent
as in other legal [consultations]. For example, in a comparable situa-
tion, a client possessed of facts concerning his activities might seek
advice as to the legality of his acts under state statutes, such as
stream pollution; yet this would be a privileged communication even
though the attorney's advice would be based upon a public document,
that is, the state statutes.
From consideration of the above situations, it is submitted that the
reason for permitting clients of patent attorneys to claim exemption
from discovery based on the attorney-client privilege is just as great
as in other cases wherein the consultations meet the standards set
forth for the privilege. This conclusion is supported by judicial
authority.
Judicial determinations following the United Shoe 27 decision have
tended to establish the attorney-client privilege in patent matters
upon a more rational basis although its influence is still evident. In
an important case following United Shoe,28 Zenith Corp. v. Radio
Corp. of America,2 9 Judge Leahy extended the attorney-client privi-
lege to corporate patent attorneys who were not members of the local
bar, but only when they were not working in typical patent matters,
thus deviating slightly from Judge Wyzanski's strict standard.
The extension of the application of the privilege doctrine was a
qualified one in that the majority of consultations of clients and patent
attorneys concerns the preparation of patent applications and the
prosecution thereof in the Post Office, infringement studies, validity
studies and the like. In denying privlege to these consultations, Judge
Leahy restricted the application of the privileged communications
doctrine to patent attorneys to a narrow area.
26. See, e.g., Zenith Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 101
U.S.P.Q. 316 (D.Del. 1954); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211
F. Supp. 85, 135 U.S.P.Q. 235 (D.Del. 1962).
27. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q.
5 (D.Mass.1950).
28. Ibid.
29. 121 F. Supp. 792, 101 U.S.P.Q. 316 (D.Del. 1954).
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While Judge Leahy's test 30 has been followed in certain in-
stances, 3 1 some recent cases have further extended the privilege to
client-patent attorney communications involving typical patent mat-
ters. In International Minerals v. Golding-Keane3 2 the court held
that the privilege applied to correspondence between attorneys and
between counsel and inventor referring to legal advice, which was
never effectuated, in an application for letters patent; said applica-
tion having matured into a patent and being involved in litigation.33
Another 'case which extended the application of privilege in
patent matters was Ellis-Foster v. Union Carbide Corp.3 4 There
the court held that although the attorney performed tasks which
could have been performed by non-attorneys, nonetheless the privi-
lege should apply to an attorney when employed as an attorney and
that the admission of non-lawyers in the field of patent practice should
not be considered sufficient reason for breaking down well recognized
and soundly based rules affecting a claim of privilege. 3 5
In Garrison v. General Motors Corp.,3 6 the court greatly extended
the application of privilege to patent matters as the court refused to
follow Judge Leahy's test in determining what constitutes the prac-
tice of law. The court held that a patent attorney is engaged in the
practice of law when in a certain matter the client believes legal
advice to be necessary, such as inquiry made in reference to a certain
patent or application therefor, with respect to litigation, infringe-
ment, validity or purchase.3 7 In reaching its conclusion, the court
30. Id. at 794. Judge Leahy stated that patent attorneys do not act as
lawyers ". . . [W]hen not primarily engaged in legal activities; when largely
concerned with technical aspects of a business or engineering character, or
competitive considerations in their companies constant race for patent proficiency,
or the scope of public patents, or even the general application of patent law to
developments of their companies and competitors; when making initial office
preparatory determinations of patentability based on inventor's information,
prior art or legal tests for invention and novelty; when drafting or comparing
patent specifications and claims; when preparing the application for letters
patent or amendments thereto and prosecuting same in the Patent Office; when
handling interference proceedings in the Patent Office concerning patent applica-
tions."
31. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp.
85, 135 U.S.P.Q. 235 (D.Del. 1962).
32. 162 F. Supp. 137, 118 U.S.P.Q. 501 (W.D.N.Y. 1958).
33. Id. at 141.
34. 159 F. Supp. 917, 116 U.S.P.Q. 576 (D.N.J. 1958).
35. Id. at 920.
36. 213 F. Supp. 515; 136 U.S.P.Q. 343 (S.D.Calif. 1963).
37. Id. at 520.
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cited State of Florida, The Florida Bar v. Sperry3 8 and Chicago Bar
A9s'n. v. Kellogg3 9 as authority for the proposition that advice on
patentability, especially in regard to infringement and enfornement
of patents, involves the practice of law.
In another recent case involving privilege, Paper Converting Ma-
chine Co. v. Patterson,4 0 the court held that (1) membership in the
bar is not a necessity if other attributes are present, (2) the corporate
patent attorney is not denied privilege merely because of his ca-
pacity, and (3) privilege attaches where a client seeks a patent
attorney's advice on a legal matter such as alleged infringement. 4 1
As to this last point, the court concluded that privilege does not
attach if the facts communicated to the attorney are publicly
known. 4 2 In his case the defendant was manufacturing and selling to
the public a mechanical device which plaintiff contended was infring-
ing plaintiff's patent. Inasmuch as the alleged infringing device was
publicly known, the court evidently felt that there were no confiden-
tial facts to be disclosed by defendant to his attorney and that there
was, therefore, no basis for applying the attorney-client privilege.
The court in the Paper Converting Machine Co. case while appear-
ing to apply an enlightened standard of privilege to patent attorneys,
held that correspondence from a patent attorney to the United States
38. Fla., 140 So.2d 587, 133 U.S.P.Q. 157 (1962). The Supreme
Court of Florida held that a patent attorney not admitted to practice law in
Florida nor in any other state who held himself out to the public in Florida as
qualified to advise as to patentability and did so advise, was engaging in the
practice of law, and that was true if the act of advising concerned the infringe-
ment of patent rights. (Although the Supreme Court termed Sperry a patent
attorney, he was not a member of the bar of any jurisdiction and under present
Patent Office regulations would not qualify as a patent attorney but as a patent
agent; Rules of Practice, U.S. Patent Office, Rule 341 (1960). The confusion in
terminology resulted because Sperry was registered to practice before the
Patent Office prior to November 15, 1938, at which time all registrants were
listed as a patent attorney whether they were attorney at law or not.) The case
was heard on certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), and
reversed; however, the court did not contradict the Florida Supreme Court's
determination of what constituted the practice of law, but held that as a patent
agent Sperry had certain privileges bestowed by Federal law which pre-empted
state authority. Modified below, Fla., 159 S 2d 229 (1963).
39. 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E. 2d 519, 83 U.S.P.Q. 269 (1949). In this case
the court held the following to be the practice of law: preparing, drafting and
construing patent licenses and deeds, assignments and other evidences of transfer
of title to or interest in patents; rendering legal opinions relating to title and
validity, infringement and enforcement of patents and trademarks.
40. 215 F. Supp. 249, 136 U.S.P.Q. 549 (E.D.Wis. 1963).
41. Id. at 251.
42. Id. at 252.
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Patent Office is not privileged. 4 3 While this holding is supported by
case law,4 4 it is criticized as a general holding inasmuch as such
correspondence should be privileged when it is based upon confidential
communications by a client to his attorney. Although the Patent
Office is a third party, disclosure to it should not be considered a
waiver of the privilege 4 5 inasmuch as communications received by the
Patent Office are treated with confidence 4 6 and are unavailable to the
public until the application matures into a patent. If the application
fails to mature into a patent, then the application is relegated
to secrecy as an abandoned application. 4 7 The courts, however, have
held that Patent Office regulations do not bind a court of law. 4 8
Although the courts attempt to protect any trade secrets contained
in applications discovered from the Patent Office 4 9 , the practice is
criticized as not affording a client of an attorney-at-law the full
measure of the attorney-client privileged communications doctrine.
By analogy, many aspects of the practice of patent law are ob-
viously as entitled to the attorney-client privilege as are areas of law
where the privilege is conventionally recognized, for example, in will
drafting. In will drafting, the attorney-client privilege has been
historically applied where discovery of the will or communications
relevant thereto were attempted to be discovered prior to the tes-
43. Ibid.
44. See e.g., Edison Electric Light Co. v. U.S. Electric Light Co., 44 Fed.
294 (2d Cir. 1890); Utah Radio Products Co. v. Delco Appliance Corp., 19 F.
Supp. 143, 32 U.S.P.Q. 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
45. 8 WIGMORE § 2325. At 633 it is provided: "Since the attorney has implied
authority to make admissions and otherwise to act in all that concerns the
management of the cause, all disclosures (oral or written) voluntarily made to
. . . third persons in the course of negotiations for settlement, or in the course
of taking adverse steps in litigation ... , are receivable as being made under an
implied waiver of privilege, . ...
46. 35 U.S.C. § 122, Rules of Practice U.S. Patent Office, Rule 14(a) (1960).
Maintenance of pending patent applications in secrecy should maintain the con-
fidentiality requirement of the attorney-client privilege even though the Patent
Office is a third party. In United States v. Fouts, 166 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.Ohio 1958)
it was held that a letter written by a prisoner's attorney to the prisoner in the
penitentiary was a privileged communication between prisoner and his attorney
even though it was read and censored by officers of the penitentiary.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 122. Rules of Practice, U.S. Patent Office, Rule 14(b) (1960).
48. Edison Electric Light Co. v. U.S. Electric Light Co., 44 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.
1890).
49. Utah Radio Products Co. v. Delco Appliance Corp., 19 F. Supp. 143, 32
U.S.P.Q. 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1937). The court held that pending patent applications
may be disclosed under certain conditions; however, the court will provide for
protection of trade secrets contained therein.
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tator's death. 50 The privilege has even been held to apply to un-
executed wills after the decease of the client.5 1
The analogous situation of an attorney drafting a patent would
appear to require the same right of privilege as an attorney drafting
a will. In each situation the client has possession of certain facts
and is seeking legal advice relevant thereto. In the case of a will the
client seeks advice on how to dispose of his property in the manner
he desires, while in the case of a patent application, the client desires
advice on the protection of an invention which he possesses. Further-
more, in each instance, the client desires confidentiality until the
happening of a certain event; in the case of a will the event is the
death of the testator while in the case of an inventor it is the issuance
of letters patent upon his invention.
In arguing support by analogy, the comparison must be as parallel
as possible in all material respects to prevent a false conclusion. For
example, the analogy between a will drafter and a patent attorney
seems more appropriate than does an analogy of the latter with a
drafter of conveyances of property. Historically, the United States
courts have held that where no legal problem has been expressly
brought forward by the client, his communications concerning the
mere drafting of an instrument conveying property have commonly
been admitted as evidence. 5 2 However, in the drafting of a patent,
the situation is entirely different. First, until the client has disclosed
certain facts, the attorney cannot decide if any property rights
exist. The patent attorney must consider the facts communicated by
the client to determine if under the statutes and existing case law5 3
a patentable invention exists. Secondly, the attorney must advise
his client as to the best means of protecting his invention, that is,
by seeking patent protection or by practicing the invention as a trade
secret. Such advice would be legal advice and not business advice as
the attorney would be basing his advice upon his knowledge of
statutes and case law concerning patents, trade secrets, rules of
evidence and the like.
50. 8 WIGMORE § 2314. 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 505 (1948).
51. 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 505 (1948).
52. 8 WIGMORE § 2297.
53. The frequent review by appellate courts of the issue of patentability
indicates that at least for the purposes of review, the question of patentability
is considered one of law. In Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950), the Supreme Court held unpatentable a device which
had been concluded as patentable by two lower courts. In a concurring opinion,
Mr. Justice Douglas, at 155 stated, "The standard of patentability is a constitu-
tional standard; and the question of validity of a patent is a question of law."
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The fitting analogy between a drafter of wills and a patent attorney,
and the hypothetical situations posed hereinabove, indicate that
decisions such as Garrison v. General Motors Corp. properly apply the
attorney-client privilege as readily to patent attorneys and their
clients as to any other attorney-client relationship. This complete
recognition of the attorney-client privilege in patent matters is not
an extension of the privilege as patent atorneys are attorneys-at-law
and thus qualify as proper subjects under any theory defining the
attorney-client privileged communications doctrine. The only con-
sideration which should be before a court in determining the appli-
cability of the attorney-client privilege in a certain situation should
be the requisities of the privilege 5 4 and not the label on the attorney
involved.
THE DEMISE OF FAIR TRADE IN PENNSYLVANIA:
A STUDY OF JUDICIAL DISENCHANTMENT*
INTRODUCTION
In a 5-2 decision handed down on March 26, 1964,1 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the nonsigner provi-
sion of the state's Fair Trade Act.2 Thus Pennsylvania joins the
54. 8 WIGMORE § 2292. Set forth in the text, supra at note 9.
* It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the history of Fair Trade
nor to define It. The reader is cited to a representative cross-section of material
both pro and con. Weston, Fair Trade, Alias "Quality Stabilization": Status,
Problems and Prospects, 22 A.B.A. ANTI-TRUST SECTION 76 (1963); Conant, Resale
Price Maintenance: Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clauses, 109 U. OF PA. L. REv.
539 (1961); Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes and Competitive Effects, 27
GEO. WASH. LAw REv. 621 (1958); Note, Fair Trade and The State Constitution,
10 VAND. L. REv. 415 (1957); Van Mell, The Case for Fair Trade, 44 ILL. BAR J.
40 (May 1955); Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 175 (1954);
Schachtman, Resale Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. OF PITT.
L. R. 562 (1950); Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and The Law of Restrictive
Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L. J. 607 (1940).
1. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores Inc., 414 Pa. 95,
199 A. 2d 266 (1964).
2. "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated In any contract entered into pursuant
to the provisions of section one of this act, whether the person so advertising,
offering for sale, or selling is, or is not, a party to such contract, is unfair com-
petition and in actionable at the suit of such vendor, buyer, or purchaser of such
commodity. .. ." 73 P.S. § 8
[Vol. 2: p. 286
